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Fare v. Michael C.: Juveniles and In Custodial
Interrogations
In the principal case, Fare v. Michael C., the United States Supreme
Court rejects the position of the Supreme Court of California that a juve-
nile's request for the presence of his probation officer constitutes an invoca-
tion of the juvenile's right to remain silent within the meaning of the
Miranda decision. The author examines the rationale applied by each
court enroute to this split of opinion, and suggests a middle ground which
would accomodate the concerns of both courts with respect to the protec-
tion of an accused juvenile at the custodial interrogation stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,' held
that when a person is taken into police custody, or has been de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way, he must be
advised of his constitutional rights.2 The Court realized that in
custodial interrogations, the "potentiality for compulsion is force-
fully apparent," and that without proper safeguards the process of
in custodial interrogation would compel an individual "to speak
where he would otherwise not do so freely."3
In the years following Miranda, there has been considerable
controversy regarding the extent of Miranda's prophylactic
shield, and under what circumstances the safeguards of Miranda
will apply to juveniles.
This note will examine the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Fare v. Michael C.,4 which held that only an express de-
mand to remain silent, or to speak with an attorney, will per se
invoke one's fifth amendment rights.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In Fare,5 sixteen year old Michael C. was taken into custody by
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 478-79 (prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evi-
dence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he can not afford an attorney one will be appointed for him).
3. Id. at 457, 467.
4. 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
5. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978). In Re Michael C., is the
the police on suspicion of murder. After being advised of his Mi-
randa rights, and acknowledging that he understood them, he
was asked if he wanted his attorney present. Michael replied,
"Can I have my probation officer here?" He was told by the police
that his probation officer was not available at that time, and was
asked if he would talk with them without an attorney present.
Michael agreed and subsequently made incriminating statements
and sketches. 6
III. ANALYSIS BY THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
In the Fare opinion, the California Supreme Court stressed that
its decision was not based upon the voluntariness of Michael's
confession.7 Rather, the decision turned upon whether or not his
request for his probation officer was an invocation of his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 8
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda clearly recog-
case name at the California Supreme Court level, and Fare v. Michael C. is the
case name used by the United States Supreme Court.
6. After advising the defendant of his Miranda right's, the following conversa-
tion took place:
Q. . . . Do you understand all of these rights. as I have explained them to
you?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and talk to us
about the murder?
A. What murder? I don't know about no murder.
Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it.
A. Yeah, I might talk to you.
Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present here
while we talk about it?
A. Can I have my probation officer here? (court's emphasis)
Q. Well, I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have
the right to an attorney.
A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's
an attorney.
Q. Huh?
A. (repeat last question).
Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen.
A. Yeah.
Q. Well, I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's a good
chance we can talk to him later, but I'm not going to call him right
now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If
you don't want to, you don't have to. But if you want to say some-
thing, you can, and if you don't want to say something you don't have
to. That's your right. You understand that right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?
A. Yeah, I want to talk to you.
Id. at 473-74, 579 P.2d at 8, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (1978).
7. Id. at 477, 579 P.2d at 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (1978).
8. The importance of this decision is a result of the Court's interpretation of
Miranda, and what is necessary to per se invoke one's fifth amendment right.
This point will further be explored infra, when the two courts decision's are com-
pared. See also, 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 579 P.2d at 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (1978).
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nized the need for adequate protective devices in connection with
in custodial interrogations.9 The Court specified four warnings
which were required to be given to all persons in a custodial sur-
rounding 0 and held that once the individual asserted his fifth
amendment right, in whatever manner, interrogation must
cease.
1 1
Following this line of thought, the California Supreme Court
had previously held that an individual need not expressly state
his request for an attorney in order to invoke his fifth amendment
rights. The court in People v. Randall stated, "no particular form
of words or conduct is necessary."12 All that is necessary is con-
duct, which "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present will-
ingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and
completely with the police at that time."13
In interpreting the extent and nature of Miranda's application,
California's Supreme Court proclaimed, "[ilt would certainly se-
verely restrict the 'protective devices' required by Miranda in
cases where the suspects are minors if the only call for help
which is to be deemed an invocation of the privilege [against self
incrimination] is the call for an attorney."'14 The court in People v.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court held that:
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one
of our nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be
compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choice.
Id. at 457, 458.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. The Miranda court stated:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during ques-
tioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At
this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege can-
not be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
12. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662,
(1970) (suspect's telephone call to his attorney). See also People v. Burton, 6 Cal.
3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971) (request by a minor to see his parents);
People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969) (suspect's
statement: "Call my parents for my attorney"); People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714,
441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968) (suspect's refusal to sign a waiver of his con-
stitutional rights).
13. 1 Cal. 3d 948, 956, 464 P.2d 114, 119, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1970).
14. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 382, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6
(1971).
Burton held that it was foolish to assume that a minor in custody
would call an attorney for assistance. Rather, it is far more likely
that he would look to his parents for help.' 5 Therefore, the court
reasoned that when a minor requests to see one of his parents, it
is to be construed as an invocation of his fifth amendment privi-
lege.1 6
The California Supreme Court in the Fare case found that, "the
juvenile court system [in California] places a close relationship
between a minor and his probation officer."17 Additionally, the
court held that it was the job of the probation officer to care for
and advise the juvenile' 8 as well as "to represent the interests" of
the juvenile, 'in accordance with legislative enactments.19 These
findings, combined with the instructions of the probation officer to
the juvenile that he was to be contacted immediately 20 led the
California Supreme Court to analogize with Burton2' and to hold,
"that the minor's request for a probation officer ... indicated that
the minor intended to assert his fifth amendment privilege."22
In judging a minor's request to see his probation officer as con-
duct which "reasonably appears inconsistent with a present will-
ingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and
completely with the police at that time,"23 the court placed the
burden on the state to demonstrate that such a request is not in-
tended to be construed as an assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege. 24
The California court, finding that the state did not meet this
burden, held that because the police did not immediately cease
15. The majority stated that:
It is fatuous to assume that a minor in custody will be in a position to call
an attorney for assistance and it is unrealistic to attribute no significance
to his call for help from the only person to whom he normally looks-a
parent or guardian. It is common knowledge that this is the normal reac-
tion of a youthful suspect who finds himself in trouble with the law.
Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5, 6 (1971).
16. Id. at 382, 491 P.2d at 797, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (1971).
17. In Re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d at 476, 579 P.2d at 9, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (1978).
18. Id. at 477, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
19. Id.
20. The probation officer testified at the trial that he had "instructed Michael
that at any time he has a police contact, even if they stop him and talk to him on
the street, he is to contact me immediately" reasoning that "many times the kids
don't understand what is going on, and what they are supposed to do relative to
police ...." Id. at 476 n.2, 579 P.2d at 9 n.2., 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.2.
21. In analogizing, the court found that the minors request for a probation of-
ficer was a "call for help," just as was a request for a parent in Burton. Id. at 476,
579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
22. Id.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 478, 579 P.2d 7, 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1978). See also,
People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 383, 491 P.2d 793, 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971); Peo-
ple v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 957, 464 P.2d 114, 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664 (1970).
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their interrogation, the confession should not have been admitted,
and that such an admission was prejudicial per se and required
reversal.2 5
IV. THE HOLDING OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, re-
versed the California Supreme Court.26 The majority held that
the underlying rationale to the per se aspect of Miranda was
based upon "the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversarial
system of criminal justice in this country."27 Fundamental to the
Court's determination, was their assertion that "whether it is a
minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one per-
son to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of legal
rights of that person in his dealings with the police .... "28 The
Court reasoned that a probation officer, obviously not of the same
posture as an attorney,29 would not be able to provide for ade-
quate representation of the individual, 30 and therefore a call for a
probation officer should not be construed as a per se invocation of
one's fifth amendment rights.3 1
Further, the majority of the Court found nothing in the juve-
nile's request to speak with his probation officer which indicated
a desire to remain silent.32 As a result, the Court's analysis
shifted to a determination from the "totality of the circum-
stances" of whether or not there was a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the minor's right to remain silent and to have the assist-
ance of counsel.33 The Court, finding nothing in the record to in-
dicate otherwise, and in concurrence with the juvenile court,
found that there had been a knowing and voluntary waiver, and
therefore the juvenile's statements should have been admitted.34
Accordingly, the decision of the California Supreme Court was re-
versed and remanded.
25. Id.
26. 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
27. Id. at 2569.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2570.
31. Id. at 2571.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2572.
34. Id. at 2573.
V. COMPARISON OF THE Two DECISIONS
Under Miranda, a two step approach is taken toward the prob-
lem of in custodial confessions and waivers. First, if an individ-
ual, after having been advised of his rights, expresses his desire
to remain silent, or alternatively, asks for an attorney, then the in-
terrogation must immediately cease because either request is a
per se invocation of one's fifth amendment rights. However, if
there is no such express per se invocation, and the interrogation
continues without the presence of an attorney, a heavy burden is
placed on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-in-
crimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.35 Any
judgment as to the waiver of those rights, will be based upon the
totality of the circumstances. 36 With this in mind, the decisions
reached by the United States Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court in this case can readily be explained.
The California Supreme Court apparently felt that, in light of
its recent decisions, 37 even an equivocal waiver is sufficient to in-
voke one's fifth amendment rights. In so doing, as exemplified in
Fare, there is no need to resort to the totality of the circum-
stances test, since merely asking for one's probation officer is con-
duct which per se invokes one's fifth amendment rights.38
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court applied a
stricter interpretation of Miranda. In finding the per se rule of
Miranda was justified by the "pivotal role of legal counsel,"39 the
Court was unwilling to further extend the per se rule. The Court,
in essence held that only an unequivocal waiver4 O is a per se invo-
cation of one's fifth amendment rights. The Court was therefore
unwilling to find that a request by a juvenile to speak with his
probation officer constitutes a per se request to remain silent.4 1
In finding no per se invocation of the juveniles fifth amendment
rights, the Court proceeded to the next step of Miranda's two step
approach,42 namely, whether or not, based upon the totality of the
circumstances, a knowing and voluntary waiver of the juveniles'
35. 384 U.S. at 475 (1966).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2572; See also, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) and
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
37. In Re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978). See
also note 13 supra.
38. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 474, 579 P.2d 7, 8, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (1978).
39. 99 S. Ct. 2560, 2570 (1979).
40. The Court feels this way, despite the tone of the language used in the Mi-
randa opinion. See note 11 supra.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 2571 (1979).
42. Id. at 2572.
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fifth amendment rights had been made.43 The Court held, in ac-
cordance with the juvenile courts' findings, that there was a
knowing and voluntary waiver and that "the statements obtained
from him were voluntary, were proper, and that the admission of
those statements ... was correct."44
VI. A CATCH-22 FOR JUVENILES
The United States Supreme Court recognized a potential prob-
lem that could result with a holding giving a probation officer
more than one role to fulfill.4S In some states, a catch-22 of sorts
could result because a juvenile requesting the presence of his
probation officer, thereby indicating a desire to protect his rights
by remaining silent, might, by his request, actually hinder protec-
tion of those rights.46 This dilemma could arise in a scenario simi-
lar to the one presented in the Fare case. A juvenile who has
been arrested, requests to speak with his probation officer pursu-
ant to the instructions of the probation officer. Yet, (unlike the
Fare case) the probation officer actually encourages the juvenile
to tell the police everything (due to the probation officer's possi-
ble dual role).47 This predicament exists as a result of defects in-
herent in the juvenile justice system as it currently exists. The
question presented involves whether something can be done to
eliminate such a possibility and, at the same time, ensure a juve-
nile of his rights within the spirit and meaning of Miranda and In
Re Gault.48
43. As the Court stated:
The totality approach permits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of
the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,
and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given
him, the nature of his fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of
waiving those rights.
Id. at 2572.
44. Id. at 2573.
45. Id. at 2569. This problem was also realized by the two concurring justices
(Mr. Justice Mosk and Mme. Chief Justice Bird), of the California Supreme Court,
but they still felt that the "questioned confession" did not meet the constitutional
test of admissability. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 479, 579 P.2d 7, 12, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (1978).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2570. See also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a pro-
bation officer is not in a position to act as counsel).
47. Although the California Supreme Court has held that in California the pro-
bation officer is to represent the interests of the juvenile. See note 18 and 19
supra.
48. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court recognized that, "Special
problems may arise with respect to waiver of the [fifth amendment] privilege by
VII. A SOLUTION To THE PROBLEM
As noted, the Supreme Court has realized that there must be
special considerations given to a juvenile's waiver of his fifth
amendment rights.49 As far back as Haley v. Ohio50 the Court
took judicial notice of the special protection that juveniles re-
quire. As the opinion of Justice Douglas stated:
[Wihen, as here, a mere child--an easy victim of the law-is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender
and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more
exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens ...
[w]e cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police for
such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the
victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest
the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him. 5 1
Several years later, the Court, in Gallegos v. Colorado,52 pro-
nounced that "[a] 14-year old boy, no matter how sophisticated
... is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to
get the benefits of his constitutional rights."53 The Court also
stated that:
He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confes-
sion were without advice as to his rights-from someone concerned with
securing him those rights .... A lawyer or an adult relative or friend
could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity
could not .... Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14
year old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitu-
tional rights as he had.54
While the Supreme Court has obviously recognized, for a long
period of time, that juveniles are in need of special consideration,
it has only recently chosen not to grant certiorari in a case where
the issue presented was whether a "juvenile can validly waive his
right to remain silent and consult with an attorney in the absence
of competent advice from an adult who does not have significant
conflicts of interest."55 Yet, several studies, independent of those
of the court, have supported the proposition that a juvenile
should be given competent adult advice before being allowed to
waive his fifth amendment rights. Such a rule has been proposed
or on behalf of children ... the greatest care must be taken to assure that the ad-
mission ... was not coerced or suggested,..." Id. at 55.
49. See note 48 supra.
50. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
51. Id. at 599, 600.
52. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Little v. Arkansas, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, cert. denied. 435 U.S. 957,
rehearing denied 436 U.S. 923 (1978) (In this case the child did consult with an
adult, but the advice given was not rational, the adult was confused at the time of
the giving of the advice, and the child was a 13 year old girl of "low dull normal"
intelligence).
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by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice,56 the Council of Judges of the National Coun-
cil of Crime and Delinquency,5 7 and the Institute of Judicial
Administration-American Bar Association Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards.58 The reason that they favor this ap-
proach is clear. They recognize that "most juveniles are not ma-
ture enough to understand their rights and are not competent to
exercise them."59 Juveniles are in an obviously inferior position
in relation to their interrogators.60 Alone, without adult advice,
only a small percentage of juveniles are able to knowingly and in-
telligently waive their Miranda rights.61
While a small minority of state courts have expressed their
agreement that juveniles be required to receive competent adult
advice before waiving their constitutional rights,62 and a few
56. The Commission recommended that: "Counsel should be appointed as a
matter of course whenever coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any
affirmative choice by child or parent." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY 87 (1967).
57. THE COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, Rule 25, at 53 (1969), proposed the
following: "No extra-judicial statement by a child to a police officer or a court of-
ficer shall be admitted into evidence unless made in the presence of a parent or
guardian of the child, or of the child's counsel."
58. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PO-
LICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS (1977). Standard 3.2 reads as follows:
Police investigation into criminal matters should be similar whether the
suspect is an adult or a juvenile. Juveniles, therefore, should receive at
least the same safeguards available to adults in the criminal justice sys-
tem. This should apply to:
A. preliminary investigations (e.g., stop and frisk);
B. the arrest process;
C. search and seizure;
D. questioning;
E. pretrial identification;
F. prehearing detention and release.
For some investigative procedures, greater constitutional safeguards are
needed because of the vulnerability of juveniles. Juveniles should not be
permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own. (emphasis added).
Id. at 54.
59. See generally Foster and Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Po-
lice Practice, and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. REV. 567, 596 (1969).
60. See note 51 supra.
61. See generally, Ferguson and Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1970).
62. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 436-40, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141-43 (1972); In
re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 279-83 (Mo. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Webster, 466
states, such as Colorado,63 Connecticut,64 and Oklahoma,65 have
statutorily provided for adult advice for juveniles before a valid
waiver of their fifth amendment rights can occur, the majority of
the states have not.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It appears that the current United States Supreme Court will
continue to limit the protective shield provided by Miranda. The
Court's holding that a juvenile's request to see his probation of-
ficer is not an invocation of his Miranda rights, seems to reward
those who are our system's worst offenders. For only those cun-
ning few, who through previous dealings and troubles with the
law, will be wise enough to possibly understand and evoke their
constitutional rights. It is obvious that something must be done
to protect the rights of the majority of our nation's juvenile of-
fenders, so as not to expose them as easy prey for sophisticated
Pa. 314, 320-28, 353 A.2d 372, 375-79 (1975). See also Weatherspoon v. State, 328
So.2d 875, 876 (Fla. 1976).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I) (1973) provides:
No statements or admissions of a child made as a result of interrogation
of the child by a law enforcement official concerning acts alleged to have
been committed by the child which would constitute a crime if committed
by an adult shall be admissable in evidence against the child unless a par-
ent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child was present at such interro-
gation and the child and his parent, guardian, or legal custodian, were
advised of the child's right to remain silent, that any statements made
may be used against him in a court of law, the right of the presence of an
attorney during such interrogation, and the right to have counsel ap-
pointed if so requested at the time of the interrogation....
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137(a) (West Supp. 1979) provides:
Any admission, confession or statement, written or oral, by a child shall
be inadmissable in any proceeding for delinquency against the child mak-
ing such admission, confession, or statement unless made by such child in
the presence of his parent or parents or guardian and after the parent or
parents or guardian and child have been advised (1) of the child's right to
retain counsel, or if unable to afford counsel, to have counsel appointed on
the child's behalf, (2) of the child's right to refuse to make any statements
and (3) that any statements he makes may be introduced into evidence
against him.
65. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(a) (West Supp. 1979) provides:
No information gained by questioning a child nor any evidence subse-
quently obtained as a result of such information shall be admissable into
evidence against the child unless the questioning about any alleged of-
fense by any law enforcement officer or investigative agency, or employee
of the court, or the Department is done in the presence of said child's par-
ents, guardian, attorney or the legal custodian of the child, and not until
the child and his parents, or guardian, or other legal custodian shall be
fully advised of their constitutional and legal rights, including the right to
be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and the right
to have counsel appointed by the court if the parties are without sufficient
financial means; provided, however, that no legal aid or other public or
charitable legal service shall make claim for compensation as contem-
plated herein ....
See also ALA. CODE tit. § 12-15-67.
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police interrogators who might play upon their inexperience and
naivete. It is evident that the remedy must come through legisla-
tive enactments, similar to those noted above, in order to protect
this country's youthful offenders from the compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogations.
GREGORY S. CHUDACOFF

